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This survey analyses two types of models: 1. Models based on assumptions of 
monetary and financial market equilibrium disturbance, in line with mainstream 
thinking according to which if there is a self-regulating market the units would have 
rational expectations, and the crisis would be a temporary phenomenon caused by 
exogenous shocks. Here are the main objectives and features characteristic of three 
generations of models; 2. Models based on financial instability hypothesis, taking into 
account the dynamics of financial market, as well as the role of uncertainty, 
interdependency and dynamic complexity. We present here Minsky’s concept of 
financial instability and then analyse the content of some simplified models. 
Keywords: instability, model generations, balance sheet, hedge units, speculative 
units, Ponzi units, cyclical fluctuations, complexity
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1. Introduction 
The financial instability and the economic crisis facing most countries in the world 
have become the hottest issues of economic research, public debates, and economic 
and financial policies. The debates imply critical comments on economic research and 
policy for their inability to forecast and prevent such phenomena and processes. 
That the present crisis took even the specialists in this field by surprise is explained by 
the existing gap between mainstream thinking (aiming to explain and model the 
origins, the nature, the effects and the dynamics of crises) and real economic 
processes or, in other words, by systematic inconsistency of mainstream theory and 
its formalized tools with very complex, dynamic and uncertain realities subject to 
acceleration and multiplication, delay, propagation and contagion (Crotty, 1986; 
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Kregel, 2007; Sau, 2010; Wray, 2008, 2009). We should also consider that economic 
and social processes are surrounded by dialectical penumbra or that they include 
qualitative elements that cannot always be expressed numerically and used in 
formalized models (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971), or require special conditions and 
forms for being expressed, modelled and interpreted (Rosser, 2000, 2005). 
Because of the high level of financialisation and complexity of developed national 
economies and world economy (Epstein, 2005; Palley, 2007), the economic cycles of 
the last decades are determined by monetary-financial flows or, in other words, the 
evolution of the economies from one stage of the economic cycle to another is 
determined by significant changes in the monetary and financial flows. While several 
decades ago the models of economic cycles considered almost exclusively the 
fluctuations of real economy variables as determinants generating and initiating 
economic crises, in the last decades most models are mainly based on fluctuations of 
nominal variables and their power of contagion (chain reaction) due to the high degree 
of financialisation. 
In the economic literature we find a wide variety of models dealing with financial crises 
and the impact of these crises on the real economy. These models can be classified 
by several criteria: the mode of interpreting the functioning of economies and markets, 
the openness of markets, methodologies, etc. Among these criteria, that concerning 
the interpretation of the functioning of financial markets is the most important. In fact, it 
determines how correctly the economic and financial phenomena and processes are 
seen, analysed and treated in relation to reality. According to this criterion, the models 
of financial crises may be classified into two large categories
3:
x Models based on the assumption of disturbing the equilibrium of monetary and 
financial market, in accordance with the mainstream thinking, implying that this 
market is self-adjustable, the agents might have reasonable expectations and the 
crisis is a temporary phenomenon caused by exogenous shocks, which are 
placed in the centre of the analysis of the financial cycle. 
x Models based on the assumption of financial instability, which consider both the 
dynamics of financial markets as processes and institutions and the fundamental 
role of uncertainty, interdependence and dynamic complexity of financial 
processes in relation to those of real economy (Keynes, 2009; Minsky, 1986, 
1992a, 1992b; Goodwin, 1949, 1951; Hicks, 1950, 1974; Sau, 2010; Vercelli, 
2000; Sordi, Vercelli, 2006). 
One should note that in the last half century (after the dissolution of the Breton Woods 
system) several crises and events related to financial markets have occurred in the 
                                                          
3 When referring to causes of financial instability and crisis, Lina Sau (2010) points out that there 
are two approaches in economic and financial sciences:  
a. The traditional one (represented by the Chicago School and the New Macroeconomics), 
based on the assumption that there are efficient markets; this mode places the shocks of 
exogenous factor in the centre of the analysis of the financial cycle and analyses; 
b. That based on the assumption of financial instability proposed and developed by Minsky and 
his followers; this assumption takes into account the dynamic complexity of financial markets 
as well as the significance of uncertainty and organic interdependence, which, in turn, cause 
speculative “bubbles” and financial instability. Institute of Economic Forecasting
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world (in various countries and areas). Quite often, the crises that took place in Asian 
countries (in the 1990s) and Mexico and, especially, the 2008-2010 world crisis, which 
practically affected all countries of the world, are compared with the 1929-1933 Great 
Depression because of their extent, profoundness and losses. But at a closer look we 
find out that each crisis has its own context at different levels (Eichengreen, 2000, p. 
3). When referring to causes and forms of manifestation of the crises, as well as to the 
classification of crisis models by generation, Krugman points out that models reveal a 
quite discouraging fact, that is, each crisis wave seems to choose a new style of 
model, which clarifies the crisis in accordance with reality or facts (Krugman, 2001, p. 
1).
Below, we present a synthesis of the most representative contributions to modelling 
the crises of the financial system in accordance with the two assumptions mentioned 
above. In Section 2 we deal briefly with the three generations of models (as classified 
by Krugman) built in relation to the distortion of the financial market equilibrium and 
point out the main characteristics and limits. In section 3 we present the Minskian 
model in the variant developed by Taylor-O’Connell and Foley, and Section 4 includes 
a post-Minskyan variant developed by Vercelli and his colleagues, placed in the 
context of financial markets defined as fundamentally uncertain and interdependent 
complex dynamic systems that cause financial instability directly or by propagation. 
2. Models based on the assumption of distorting 
the financial market equilibrium 
The history of models dealing with monetary and financial crises begins with “A Model 
of Balance of Payments Crises” built by Paul Krugman in 1979 and the model 
“Collapsing Exchange Rate Regimes: Some Linear Examples” built by Flood and 
Garber in 1984, which were followed by many others. The authors confine these 
models to the context of facts and events and, according to this, within the limits of 
knowledge and methodologies and establish the research objectives, analyse causes 
and find the best solutions. In over 30 years, an impressive number of models dealing 
with monetary and financial crises have been built. 
Considering the need to synthesize fundamental ideas and to ensure their compliance 
with realities at each analysed stage, Krugman (1999, 2001, 2010) classifies
4 the 
models of currency and financial crises into three generations of successive 
interpretations concerning the evolution of facts and events, the causes, the extent 
and forms of manifestation, and effects of these crises. His approach is based on the 
following three observations: 
a)  The monetary crises in early 1990s, caused by disequilibrium in the payment 
and budget balances and by speculative attacks, could be resolved by 
devaluation, revaluation, changes in monetary mechanisms (fixed exchange 
rate, floating exchange rate, changes in the width of floating bands, etc.) and 
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readjustment to the mechanisms, without significant effects on real economy 
indicators (unemployment, production diminution, etc.). 
b)  The severe crises of the 1990s took place in Asia and Russia in the context of 
high mobility of capital, when the main problem was the macroeconomic policy 
concerning the speculative attacks. 
c)  There is a significant inconsistency of the models with currency and financial 
crises in the second half of the last decade and in the present decade (2001-
2010).
2.1. The first generation of models
This generation began with the model built by Krugman (1979, 1990) and developed 
and refined by Flood and Garber (1984), according to which the exogenous factor is 
the cause of the crisis. This factor is represented by speculative attacks on economies 
in distress due to fiscal deficits and the diminution of currency reserves below the 
critical level. 
Krugman’s model is based on the following assumptions:
a)  Authorities keep a fixed exchange rate until monetary reserves are exhausted 
and at that moment they make the currency float, 
b)    The deficits in the government’s budget determine speculative attacks on 
pegged currencies, 
c)    All budget deficits are financed by domestic loans. In this case, investors 
exchange only part of the growth of the domestic loan supply and the shadow 
exchange rate is depreciated gradually. When it equals the current exchange 
rate, investors attack the fixed rate and exhaust the remaining reserves 
(Eichengreen et. al., 1995, p. 11). 
Krugman’s model and Flood and Garber’s model were developed and expanded to 
include deviations from the purchasing power parity, the capital control, the 
uncertainty about monetary and fiscal policies, the portfolio optimisation by investors. 
All these expansions are described by models illustrating various types of speculative 
attacks that cause currency and financial crises in many countries. 
The literature dealing with first generation models discusses the role of some 
additional factors able to explain the crisis dynamics, such as current account deficit, 
deviations of real exchange rates, effects on the cost of public debt service when 
expected devaluation and foreign currency loan implications occur in order to protect 
stability (Allen et al., 2002). 
2.2. The second generation of models 
According to this generation, crises represent the consequences of the conflict 
between the fixed exchange rate at a certain level and government’s (political forces’) 
wish to follow a more expansionistic monetary policy in order to solve the problem of 
unemployment, of economic growth, etc., which implies a change in the monetary 
parity and interest rate. The change in parity and interest rate determines the 
speculators’ action, which leads to monetary crises and a new exchange rate balance. 
The second generation includes models that describe the monetary crises in 
European countries pertaining to the European monetary mechanism, ERM, between 
1992 and 1993, and the monetary crisis in Mexico between 1994 and 1995. The Institute of Economic Forecasting
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attack on these countries’ currencies made researchers study more and find adequate 
conclusions concerning these speculative attacks and the fragility of monetary 
systems (with fixed exchange rates) (Flood and Marion, 1996, 1998). Moreover, it 
made the researchers expand the study to the dynamic characterisation of the 
episodes of the crises (of the recent ones, as well), on one hand, and create systems 
of early warning about monetary crises, on the other hand.
Obstfeld (1994) opened the way to new approaches on the assumption that crises are 
a consequence of the conflict between the fixed exchange rate and the wish of the 
political authorities and economic agents to follow a more expansionistic monetary 
policy, on one hand, and to adapt themselves to the changes in the currency market 
and the real economy, on the other hand. For example, when financial investors 
expect that the government may not prefer to maintain the same parity for foreign 
currency exchange, they manipulate the interest rate in order to cause the exchange 
rate modification (Blancas, 2007). Thus, one recognizes that a crisis might be caused 
by a response of the endogenous policy, namely that provided by the authorities that 
decide the devaluation in accordance with the trade-off between benefits and costs of 
the transition from the fixed rate regime to the floating rate regime (Allen et al., 2002, 
p. 10).
Besides the fundamental weaknesses of the system consisting in currency 
overvaluation and current account deficit, panic self-creation and stirring-up add up. 
For example, in Mexico, the investors’ panic played a major role in provoking the 
crisis, since for the short-term foreign currency debts reaching maturity, the foreign 
currency reserves were not sufficient to cover the debt service, which explained and 
fully justified the investors’ panic that produced the contagious effect on the entire 
economy (Allen et al., 2002; Obstfeld 1994; Drazen-Masson, 1994; Cole and Kehoe, 
1996).
Many second generation models include solutions with multiple equilibriums for the 
exchange rate (Blancas, 2007; Allen et al., 2002; Krugman, 2010). The possibility of 
multiple equilibriums could be reinterpreted in the context of dealing with the balance 
sheet as a product of the inconsistency of liquidities in the governmental sector and 
private sector. Explicitly, the reinterpretation of multiple equilibriums based on 
inconsistency of liquidities may lead to the debt revolving crisis or banking crisis (Allen 
et al., 2002). Essentially, the second generation models express the vulnerability of 
the balance sheets of the governmental and private sectors and the fragility of the 
fixed exchange rate regime. 
Both generations of models express the vulnerable character of the fixed exchange 
rate regime in relation to speculative attacks and shortcomings caused by keeping 
fixed rates to hinder economic expansion by limiting demand and, consequently, GDP 
growth and unemployment diminution. 
Many of the monetary crises in the two generations of models did not cause significant 
negative effects on real economy in the form of economic recession. In Krugman’s 
opinion (2010, p. 6-7), the positive side of the crises described by these generations of 
models should be appreciated. The fact that the foreign currency system yielded to 
speculative attacks proved to be positive for employment and GDP growth. In  Models of Financial System Fragility 
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absence of mechanical constraints required by fixed exchange rates, governments 
gained more freedom to raise demand within the new foreign exchange regime
5.
2.3. The third generation of models 
The analysis of the 1997-1998 crises in Asian countries and Latin American countries 
represent the start of the third generation models. It differs from the first two 
generations both in objectives and in issues discussed. On one hand, this class of 
models takes into account the crisis causes and factors caused by the reforms aimed 
to liberalize markets and open economies, accompanied by profound changes in 
financial, economic and institutional mechanisms. On the other hand, this class of 
models exceeds the domain of the foreign currency crises, explained mainly by the 
depreciation in the nominal exchange rate and speculative attacks. Depreciation 
seems to be a symptom rather than a fundamental aspect of this crisis, as Krugman 
(2001, p. 8) points out. Moreover, the third generation of models takes into account 
the speculative capital, the confidence factor, the financial fragility in accordance with 
Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
6, the financial crisis, when the price of assets is crucial, and many 
others.
By passing from the foreign currency-monetary crisis issues to the monetary-financial 
crisis issues, the study scope becomes broader, more complex and more diversified. 
This is reflected in the large number of models built, in the variety of aspects analysed 
and in approaches. Most models tried to reveal and explain vulnerabilities of the 
private corporation sector, associated with those of the banking sector and the capital 
market and the imminent start of the crises at the same time with giving up 
protectionistic public policies and subsidies, as well as with the liberalisation of current 
account and capital account. 
There are several variants to interpret the main causes and forms of the third 
generation crises. 
The first variant deals with moral hazard as a common source of overinvestment, 
excessive foreign loans and current account deficits, mostly caused by hidden 
subsidies, government guarantees for private loans, etc. The elimination of such 
                                                          
5 Krugman’s joke is true to some extent when he says that the British should cast a statue of the 
speculator Soros, because after the 1992 crises provoked by him the pound changed status 
and could contribute to unemployment diminution and economic growth (Krugman, 2010). 
6 Eager to advance in defining financial stability, Bernanke and Gertler say that this stability depends 
on the net value of the potential debtors. This proposition is based on the following view: in 
general, the smaller the contribution of a debtor from his own value to his project is, the more 
divergent his interests are from those of the lenders. When a debtor has better information on his 
project or a capacity to take unseen action that affects the income distribution within the project, a 
bigger inconsistency of interests increases agency costs associated with investments. Financial 
instability (fragility) may occur when entrepreneurs, assume low net value investment projects 
based on sources external to the company. For unpredictable reasons (especially during early 
stages of economic development, lasting recession, debt deflation, etc.), a substantial increase in 
agency costs may occur, thus leading to lower return on investments and economy, in general 
(Bernanke, Gertler, 1990). Institute of Economic Forecasting
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practices causes imbalances, difficulties and panic in the economy (McKinnon, Pill, 
1998; Corsetti, Pesanti, Roubini, 1999; Krugman, 1998)
7.
The second variant deals with the confidence-based banking. Losing confidence turns 
usually into precipitated action taken by financial agents liquidating the investments 
(Chang, Velasco, 1998; Diamond, Dybving, 1983; Blancas, 2007). Following this kind 
of reasoning, some authors (Sachs, Tornell, Velasco, 1996; Radelet, Sachs, 1998) 
underline in their models that a crisis might be caused not by fundamental factors, but 
mostly by unexpected panic of foreign investors, reflected in capital outflow, no loans, 
cash-flow rush, etc. In the absence of panic, such crises would have no reason to take 
place.
The third variant, developed by Krugman, reveals the leading role of corporate 
balance sheet in determining their capacity to invest and the role of capital flows, 
which – by assuming that the real exchange rate is affected – could impact on the 
balance sheet (Krugman, 1999, p. 3; Blancas, 2007, p. 6). Depending on the capital 
flow direction and, implicitly, on exchange rate and on their impact, the balance sheets 
may or may not support investments and, consequently, may or may not fuel the 
financial crisis. By means of a simple, modified version of the of Mundell-Fleming 
model containing three equations (aggregate demand, currency demand, reference 
interest equation), which includes, as specific additional computation elements, the 
interest rate, net exports and real exchange rate, Krugman relates the importance of 
the balance sheet result and the exchange rate level (Krugman, 2001, p. 9-11). The 
idea to take into account the balance sheet as a fundamental analysis and 
computation element opened a new chapter in crisis modelling. This idea was adopted 
for almost all approaches, including the alternative ones (outside the neoclassical 
trend).
The fourth variant of model is based on the effects of the financial market liberalisation 
as a factor stirring up crises. Here also we find various approaches. For example, 
Dell’Arricia and Marquez (2004) demonstrate that financial liberalisation leads to less 
option and less protection of the banks, which causes a potential increase in the 
periods of boom and collapse of loans within the cycle, and Martin and Rey (2005) 
show that the interaction between capital market liberalisation and financial frictions in 
asset markets causes investment boom and then financial collapse.
Rancière, Tornell and Westermann (2003, 2006, 2008) use in their model the same 
assumption, but expand the approach in order to determine both theoretically and 
empirically the link between economic growth and financial liberalisation and the two 
                                                          
7 For example, Mc Kinnon and Pill (1998) point out that, when reform and stabilisation 
programmes are implemented, countries prefer excessive foreign loans, which finally prove to 
be sustainable. Using a variant of Fisher’s framework model, the authors formulated a model 
in which the short-term deviations from sustainable conduct are caused by the failure of 
financial markets. Since markets fail in the conduct concerning effective information between 
depositors and creditors, excessively optimistic expectations may occur in relation to the 
successful reform between internal residents, international investors and political authorities. 
Initially, improved economic performance and foreign capital inflows justify this optimism. But 
later, binds occur in relation to sustainability conditions and the economy goes into recession, 
financial crisis and capital outflow.  Models of Financial System Fragility 
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dual sides of the latter: a) the relaxation of the constraints on loans and capital 
movement, which leads to increasing investment and speeding up economic growth; 
b) the stimulation of the systemic risk, which causes financial fragility and increases 
the probability of financial crisis and economic recession. These sides occur and 
produce effects simultaneously. The contribution of each one to economic growth 
differs from one country to another and it depends on the institutions of each country, 
the structure and characteristics of these institutions, the structure of the economy by 
branches (the share of tradeable goods and non-tradeable goods), and the economic 
policy.
To measure and analyse the connection between the systemic risk and economic 
growth, Rancière, Tornell, Westermann (2008) use a new additional tool called the 
skewness index
8 of loan increase. They distinguish between the following two types of 
frequently used development models: 
x  The economic boom is interrupted by rare and steep explosions; 
x  Up-and-down movements are more frequent, but more symmetrical and free of 
explosions.
Against the idea that financial liberalisation would not favour economic growth 
because it increases economic fragility and prepares the way for financial crises with 
severe negative effects on real economy, the above authors proved through 
applications to a panel of 58 countries and over-forty-year time series that 
liberalisation causes a faster economic growth on long term by relaxing the loan 
market and increasing investment.
3. Models based on Minsky’s financial instability 
hypothesis 
The three generations of models based on the financial equilibrium concept are too 
limited to provide satisfactory explanations and viable solutions. The transition to a 
new category of models based on the instability hypothesis means the interpretation 
of phenomena and processes according to a new concept that considers the random 
behaviour of contemporary financial markets, their complexity and fragility, the strong 
financialization and globalisation of the contemporary economy and the opening of 
heterodox and proposed by Minsky, is based on Keynesian, Schumpeterian and 
Marxian conceptual and methodological elements, besides the neoclassical ones 
(critically approached), which are still valid. 
Keynes’s and Schumpeter’s works and the critical comments made on Asian 
countries, the USA and European countries were important sources for Minsky and 
his followers for a new approach and interpretation of financial crises within economic 
                                                          
8 The skewness index measures the asymmentry of a distribution and is computed as follows: 
where:   is average size and var is the distribution vatriation. Institute of Economic Forecasting
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cycles. Minsky (1975, 1982, 1986, 1992a, 1992b) developed the financial instability 
hypothesis as an interpretation, as he said, of the substance of Keynes’s General 
Theory and as an attempt to confirm the significant characteristic of modern 
capitalism.
The financial instability hypothesis, as a theoretical argument of crises, is based on 
the following important findings: 
1. Modern capitalist economy is based: a) on investments in assets and capital 
(accumulation) that follow a real schedule; b) on a sophisticated and complex 
financial system that is linked to the investment process and the real economy 
process.
2.  Capital assets, able to produce income/profit, determine the economic agents to 
provide at present several amounts (including money borrowed from banks) for 
investments in order to obtain future return. Therefore, the present demand for 
investment goods depends on the size and intensity of expectations for future 
incomes, which expectations change rapidly, that is they have a high elasticity 
level. But the supply of investment goods is inelastic on short term. It changes 
only on long term. The highly optimistic expectations for future profit in 
conditions of widening gap between supply and demand raise the price of 
investment assets. The considerable rise in asset price is stimulated by the 
financial agency of banks and other financial institutions through loans, 
derivates, and sub-primes, which threaten financial stability. 
3.  There is a general trend in the financial system to become increasingly indebted 
especially during periods of prosperity, which causes increasing vulnerability 
because of the debt deflation crisis in conditions of tolerance of both debtors 
and creditors for the high leverage of the public and the private sectors. 
4. To present realistically different financial situations in which economic units 
(households, companies, governmental units, banking and non-banking institutions 
and, by extension, national economies) find themselves because of the 
contradiction between expectations and current realities, Minsky takes into account 
the way the funding sources, on one hand, and fund utilisation in terms of cash 
flows, on the other hand, are managed, in other words, in what proportion they are: 
x  Internal sources (profit) and external sources (loans), and 
x  Debt service payment (interest +  debt rate) and the new investment: 
Profit + loan = new investment + debt service. 
To classify economic units, Minsky also considers the three types of cash flow: 
x  from income (return), 
x  balance sheet flow (existing and inherited obligations or debts), 
x  portfolio flow (resulted from transactions in which capital and financial assets 
change hands or the owner). 
Cash flows from incomes are at the basis of balance sheet flows and portfolio flows. 
Considering these important findings, Minsky classifies economic units (including 
national economies) into the following three categories:  Models of Financial System Fragility 
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x hedge units for which the cash flows from realized and expected incomes are 
enough to meet any time the main payment obligations (debts) and make 
investments; 
x speculative units, when existing and inherited payment obligations (debts) are 
bigger than collections from realized and expected incomes, so that the only way 
to meet the payment obligations is debt rollover or even debt increase. To refund 
debts a good functioning of financial markets is required; 
x Ponzi units
9 represent the situation when, in most of the future moments, the 
payment obligations of the units exceed incomes, and these units have to 
increase debts to be able to pay the debt service. The Ponzi units (but less the 
speculative one) resort also to portfolio transactions to meet their payment 
obligations, i.e., selling assets or debts. The success or the failure of these 
transactions depend on the economic cycle phase when the price of assets rises 
(the prosperity phase) or it decreases (the crisis phase when the assets bubble 
blows up)
10.
The degree of financial instability or exposure of the economic system to the financial 
crises is closely linked to the share of each of the units mentioned above. A high 
share of hedge units ensures the robustness of the economic system. But a high 
share of speculative units and, especially, Ponzi units – in conditions of changes in the 
financial market (increasing interest or decreasing price of assets) – endangers the 
financial stability of the entire economic system and may stir up a financial crisis and 
economic recession. 
3.1. Developments of the instability hypothesis in the Taylor-O’Connell 
Model 
Although familiar with mathematics
11, Minsky developed his theory mostly by 
descriptive means. The first step towards the mathematical formalisation of Minsky’s 
theory, which characterizes the crisis in a macromodel for a closed economy, was 
made by Taylor and O’Connell (1985). Two general assumptions are considered in 
this model: a) the total nominal value in the system, macroeconomically determined, is 
dependent on confidence and the state (stage) of the economic cycle; b) there is high 
degree of asset substitution in household portfolios under certain circumstances. 
According to the above-mentioned authors, the first assumption may be properly 
understood if one adopts the postulate that the selection of assets by companies and 
households is not coordinated and companies invest in the physical capital for which 
they obtain funds by issuing shares and bonds and borrowing from intermediaries. 
                                                          
9 This category is associated with fraudulent financial practices and is named after a person who 
– in early 20th century – used a pyramid-type game scheme, according to which gains come 
from incomes collected from new-comers. 
10 The transaction frequency may also cause a price decrease or the bubble blowing-up. 
11 Minsky graduated from the Faculty of Mathematics and was granted the degree of doctor in 
economics at Harvard. Among all his works, mathematical formulations are found in the 
following books: John Maynard Keynes, Columbia University Press, New-York, 1975 and 
Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, McGraw Hill, New York, 2008. Institute of Economic Forecasting
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Households use financial intermediaries for cash deposits, share buying, etc., which 
means directing their savings to companies. The market value of shares may 
substantially deviate from the accounting value of the capital, which means decisions 
for the portfolio restructuring taken by the population and institutional investors to 
cause financial troubles to companies and expose them to disequilibriums that fuel 
crises. 
The second assumption regards the companies’ cash rush. When panic occurs, 
interest rates rise, investments decrease and rates of return diminish as well. 
Therefore, the companies’ value of capital assets and net value are on the decline. 
Thus we come to the phase of a debt deflation. This process represents financial 
disintermediation and partial disappearance of the value of capital assets. Both sets 
form a system analogue to IS-LM. 
The model analyses the dynamics of the relation between the net corporate value, on 
one hand, and the rate of return and the interest rate, on the other hand, during 
different phases of the economic cycle. The stage of early boom is characterized by 
increasing rate of return, diminishing interest rate and increasing net corporate value. 
It is the phase when companies reach the hedge position. To expand business, 
companies raise more and more loans owing to high rates of return and low interest 
rates.
The peak of the cycle is characterized by a high debt level (a high ratio of debt to net 
corporate value) while the net corporate value diminishes. It is the stage when 
companies reach the speculative position.
The collapse stage is characterized by steep decrease in profit and confidence, 
accumulation slow-down, sudden diminution in the market price of assets, which all 
cause further decline in profit and investment as well as increase the leverage up to 
insolvency (Ponzi).
Taylor and O’Connell show that bankruptcy might replace the high level of asset 
substitution, which causes dynamic instability in the stage of monetary contraction. 
Returning to Minsky’s ideas, the two authors underline the importance of financial 
intermediaries for speeding up both the boom and the crisis due to the expansion and 
contraction of assets and bonds as well as of the production sector. 
3.2. Developments of the instability hypothesis in the Foley Model 
An important step in the theoretical and empirical approach to financial instability was 
made by Foley (2003) by changing the Minskyan model of the crises formalized by 
Taylor and O’Connell. According to critical comments made by Foley, the Taylor-
O’Connell model, preserving the closed economy hypothesis, had to keep the 
Kaleckian relation of equality between the asset increase rate (g) and the saving rate 
(s), from return (r), namely, g = sr. This relation implies a sub-unit saving coefficient, s 
< 1, and, at the same time, a Minskyan regime of hedge units in which the rate of 
return is higher than the asset increase rate, r > g, which is contradicted by reality. 
The adoption of the open economy hypothesis for the inflows (imports) of capital from 
abroad allows that the asset increase rate (investment rate) exceed the rate of return, 
g > r, which implicitly means that Minsky’s speculative regime is accepted as a real 
and natural fact.  Models of Financial System Fragility 
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Foley analyses in his model the financial fragility not only at the company level, but 
also at the national economy level, as national economies are considered the totality 
of companies or their aggregate mean. He uses, on one hand, Minskyan criteria to 
comply with the three financial situations of the companies and national economies 
(hedged, speculative and Ponzi) while passing through the stages of the economic 
cycle (revival, boom, collapse) by comparing some specific indicators expressed 
either in absolute figures or in relative figures computed in two ways: by average rates 
and by marginal rates. 
Foley uses Krugman’s cash flow balance sheet method (1979, 1999), according to 
which the total of funding sources should be equivalent to total utilisation of funds. The 
specific indicators, expressed in absolute figures, refer, on one hand, to the funding 
sources and represent the net operational returns, R, and net loans, D, and, on the 
other hand, they refer to fund utilisation and represent investments (accumulations), I, 
and debt service, V. The two categories of funds, expressed through the above 
indicators, have the form of the following equivalence relation: 
. V I D R  { 
The above-mentioned indicators are used to define the three Minskyan financial states 
in which companies and national economies might be within the economic cycle: 
Hedged situations, characterized by net cash flows higher or at least equal to the 
amounts representing investments and debt service in conditions when the new debts 
are equal or, at most, equal to zero: 
; 0 d  t  I and D V R
Speculative situations, defined by the existence of net cash flows higher or at least 
equal to debt service but smaller than the sum of debt service and investments and 
also when the new debts are higher or, at least, equal to zero and bigger than 
investment: 
I; 0  t   t  but D I, and D  V V but R R
Ponzi situations, characterized by the existence of net cash flows smaller than debt 
service and new debts bigger than investments and the sum of payments and debt 
service:  
I. !   D V, so that  R
Foley takes from the Taylor-O’Connell model also the notion of net corporate and 
national economy value, considered as the difference between the asset value, A, and 
total loan value, B, that is: 
W = A – B.
This net value could rise  ) (
x
W by investments  ) ( I A  
x
and diminish by new 




) D I B A W (      
x x x
.
                                                          
*) The point above the variables represents the derivate in relation to time (e.g.,  dt / dW W  
x
).Institute of Economic Forecasting
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If the net corporate value is zero or lower than zero (Wd0) the company becomes 
insolvent and creditors cannot recover the loans granted even by selling assets. 
Theoretically, the situation can also be extended to the national economy. 
The position of the companies and the national economy in accordance with the three 
financial states and the evolution of these states in time can also be determined by 
means of variables like those mentioned above but expressed as indexes or average 
rates of the change in assets, debts, financial results, etc. related to one asset unit, as 
follows: 
x  asset growth (accumulation) rate:  A / I A / A g    
x
;
x  rate of return :  A R r /   , or  A X r / S   , where: S  is the share of return and X is 
the production value; 
x  the interest rate, representing the ratio of debt service to debt stock, i=V/B; 
x  new loan rate, d=D/A. 
The definition of the financial states and the evolution of these states by combining the 
above-mentioned average rates is achieved as follows:
x  The economy (company) is considered hedged if r > g > i, or r > i > g. In this case, 
the debt service is paid from return, and the new investments are made from 
return and loans; 
x  The economy (company) is considered speculative if g > r > i. When the interest 
rate rises, the debt service can be paid as long as there is return from productive 
investments (Schroeder, 2002, p. 14); 
x  The economy (company) is considered Ponzi if i > r. In this case, the debt service 
is paid by means of new loans. In this state, the economy becomes very 
vulnerable to a financial crisis.
Declaring an economy (company) insolvent is fully dependent on creditors’ confidence 
in the capacity of that economy (company) to recover and generate incomes. If 
creditors perceive this capacity as a diminishing one, then their confidence decreases, 
which causes, on one hand, more expensive credits and even the failure to contract 
new loans, and, on the other hand, chain bankruptcy of companies, which produces a 
dramatic impact on real economy and social life. 
The risk of insolvency decreases or even disappears when the return increases or the 
rate of return is higher than the interest rate: r > i. In this case, the economy moves 
directly from the Ponzi state to the hedged state. 
Shaikh (1996) and, later, Schroeder (2002) proposed the use of marginal rates either 
instead of average rates or as an alternative of comparison, considering that in an 
essentially uncertain world this form could be a better guide for what companies 
expect to gain from new investments. For example, if the marginal rate of return 
functions as a signal for directing capital flows, then why could this rate not implicitly 
influence also the capital accumulation?
12
                                                          
12 The proposals consists of the following simple computation formulas based on differences:  Models of Financial System Fragility 
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After applications, Schroeder found that the marginal rate of return tended to be more 
volatile than the average rate since it reproduced cyclical changes on short term in the 
aggregate demand, which questioned the idea that marginal rates could actually be a 
guide for making investments (Schroeder, 2002; Blancas, 2007, p. 25). 
4. Cyclical fluctuations and financial instability in a 
post-Minskyan dynamic and structural 
interpretation
Important steps in modelling a financial crisis in a Minskyan tradition have been made 
by Vercelli (1999, 2000, 2009a, 2009b), Sordi, Vercelli (2003, 2006, 2010), Dieci, 
Sordi, Vercelli (2005) and others. Vercelli and his collaborators reinterpret Minsky’s 
financial instability hypothesis, moving from the description of so-called moments to 
the description of dynamic processes and considering as analysis instruments the 
balance of net financial flows and the liquidity and solvency coefficients (rates) at unit 
level and aggregate level. Also, they explain cyclical fluctuations, redefine the financial 
instability states and the expectation extrapolation, and reconsider the Minskyan 
classification of units and economies according to their financial state. Sordi, Dieci and 
Vercelli describe the complex dynamic behaviour
13 of units and economies and the 
conditions of discontinuities
14, bifurcations and the chaos state of the economies, 
                                                                                                                               
- the marginal rate of return computed by the ratio of return change between two periods to 
asset stock change over the same periods: 
1  '   ' '   t
' I / R A / R r , where: 
1 1 1         '    ' t t t t t I A A A ; R R R ;
- the marginal rate of accumulation determined by the ratio of investment amount change to the 
asset amount change: 
1  '   ' '   t
' I / I A / I g , where: 
1 1 1         '    ' t t t t t I A A A ; I I I ;
- the marginal interest rate determined by the ratio of debt service to the previous year’s loan 
amount:
1  '   ' '   t
' D / V B / V i , where: 
1 1 1         '    ' t t t t t D B B B úi V V V .
13 According to Rosser (2005), broad tent complexity includes four sub-domains (sub-types), 
known as the 4 Cs: 1) cybernetics, developed by Norbert Wiener (1961) and applied to 
economic sciences by Lange (1967), Forrester (1977) and others; the theory of catastrophe 
developed by René Thom (1972) and applied to economic sciences first by Christopher 
Zeeman (1974), Hal Varian (1979), Kaldor (1940); the chaos theory developed by Ed. Lorenz 
(1963) and other mathematicians and physicists and applied to economic sciences first by 
Robert May (1976), David Rand (1978), Strotz, McAnulty, Naines (1953), Goodwin (1967); 
Albu (2006, 2010); Purica (2006); small tent complexity, focused on heterogenous models 
including interacting agents and using computer simulations, was applied to economic 
sciences first by Fölmer (1974). 
14 Discovered by Poincaré during his research on the qualitative theory of differential equations, 
bifurcation is the fundamental element for analysing discontinuities in non-linear dynamic Institute of Economic Forecasting
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using a simple aggregate model with equations containing differences, as well as an 
amended and generalized version of the discrete-time non-linear multiplying-
accelerating model built by Goodwin (1949, 1951, 1988). 
The above-mentioned authors based their approaches on the Keynesian idea that the 
explanation of fluctuations and instability should consider dynamic incongruities 
between certain current realities and long-term expectations for a low-level probability 
of investments, of their rate of return and of other factors and ingredients
15. Moving 
from the real economy to the nominal economy
16 we may come to the same 
explanation of the cause of instability, i.e., that one represented by the interaction 
between the evolution of current cash flows and the evolution of anticipated 
(intertemporal) cash flows considered at the unit level and aggregate level. This idea 
could be functional only by introducing the following indicators: 
a) Current liquidity coefficient, kit, resulted from the ratio of cash outflows, eit, and cash 







The lower than 1 the coefficient is, the higher (in excess) the liquidity level is. 
b) Expected solvency coefficient, 
*
it k , measures the ratio of cash outflows and inflows 
expected within a time horizon, n, to the current interest rate, r, and is computed by 





























The expected financial solvency (sustainability) of the system is ensured when 
1
* d it k .
These two coefficients, as main variables, can be combined to create new dynamic 
analytical tools to express financial fluctuation and instability, and Minsky’s taxonomic 
map can be expanded and made operational. 
                                                                                                                               
systems. It regards the bifurcation of equilibria of non-linear dynamic systems at critical values 
(inflexions), i.e., when discontinuities or transitions to new qualitative states take place. The 
chaos theory and the theory of catastrophe are two distinct sides of discontinuity. Chaotic 
dynamics defines the sensitivity of dependence on the initial conditions so that a small change in 
an intial condition (in a variable or a parameter) causes very big changes, even distruction, on 
the dynamic trajectory of the system (Rosser, 1998). 
15 Keynes, 2009, pp. 211-2. 
16 To a certain point, the relations within the money economy represent the mirror of real 
economy relations. Beyond this point, the money economy influences the real economy 
decisively and mostly in one direction (Epstein, 2008).  Models of Financial System Fragility 
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Both the current liquidity coefficient and the expected solvency coefficient expressed 
as a ratio of cash outflows to cash inflows were placed in mutual relations in a 
Cartesian diagram (Figure 1) with coordinates (
*
it k , kit), in which the horizontal line, 
called the liquidity line, starts from kit=1 upwards of downwards, and the vertical line, 
called the solvency barrier, starts from k
*=1 to the left or to the right. Measures 1 are 
limit values. Exceeding values 1 means lack of liquidity and lack of solvency, 
respectively. Going below these values means liquidity surplus and additional 
solvency, respectively. 
The Cartesian space created by coefficients 
*
it k  and kit and used for studying financial 
fluctuations allows selecting a safety limit defined by an additional vertical line, which 
– being placed to the left of the solvency barrier – shows the minimisation of 
bankruptcy risk. Beyond this, the unit cannot go since solvency comes into question. 
The safety limit is denoted by 1 - P . Parameter P   represents the aversion to risk 
that may take on the values    (0 < P  < 1). 
The definition of the above coefficients and the relations between them allowed 
Vercelli to classify the financial states of companies into six positions: over-hedged, 
hedged, hyper-speculative, speculative, hyper-distressed, distressed and characterize 
their place and dynamics within financial fluctuations. 
Figure 1 
Classification of companies by financial state 
Figure 1 shows the map of the positions held by units classified according to their 
financial conditions and distributed according to the stages they go through within the 
economic cycle. The diagram also shows the liquidity line (k = 1), the insolvency 
barrier (k
* = 1) and the safety limit (1 - P ).
The dynamic study of financial conditions of a unit in the area defined by the two Institute of Economic Forecasting
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coefficients (
*
it k , kit) is based on the following assumptions: 
a)  Each unit prefers higher returns in unchanged conditions (ceteris paribus);
b)  Financial returns are positively correlated in relation to the risk shown by the 
distance from the safety limit; 
c)    Economic units (including households) are characterized by the competitive 
behaviour and the “herd” behaviour caused by the market pressure and mass 
psychology, respectively. 
Under these circumstances, a feedback occurs between the coefficients kit and 
*
it k ,










it 1 1  E  
   (3) 





it it P   D   
  1 1    (4) 
where: (kit+1 - kit) / kit represents the growth rate and  0 ! E D i i , represents the 
adaptation speed of unit i. Within this model describing the cyclical fluctuations of 
variables
*
it k  and kit, the equations have the logical basis presented below: 
Equation (3) deals with relations between the extrapolated expected solvency value 
and current liquidity values, and it implies discussions and disputes against which 
Vercelli brought certain arguments that deserve consideration. When units see a 
realized current liquidity coefficient higher than 1 because of cash outflows in excess 
against inflows, they expect that this happen in the next periods as well. Even if the 
units are aware of the existence of financial cycles and anticipate a shift to financial 
inflows in excess over a longer period, their importance for making decisions is 
smaller because of the discount (capitalisation) of the values. Questioning the 
reasonable character of the expectation extrapolation, Vercelli considers that the 
extrapolated expectations proved unreasonable ex post only in proximity to the 
turning-point (crisis) of the cycles, since they are intrinsically unpredictable (Vercelli, 
2009a, p. 12 and Sordi and Vercelli, 2009b); 
Equation (4) shows that when the expected solvency coefficient has a value below the 
safety limit of a unit, the current liquidity coefficient tends to increase just as utility or 
return might do. On the contrary, as the safety threshold is crossed, the unit makes 
efforts to return to the safety area and tries to increase the liquidity level and diminish 
indebtness.
                                                          
17 This type of model expresses the dynamic relation between plundering populations and 
plundered populations. The Lotka-Volterra model, known as “model of predator-prey 
interactions”, consists of a pair of differential equations of first order, used to describe the 
dynamics of biological systems in which two species predator-prey) interact in nature. In 
economic sciences, this model, adopted accordingly, was used in 1967 by Richard Goodwin 
to describe economic fluctuations, by combining aspects of the Harrod-Domar growth model 
with the Phillips curve to generate endogenous cycles at the macroeconomic level. Moreover, 
the Lotka-Voltera model was extended by Steve Keen (1998) to the study of the debt–
deflation process.  Models of Financial System Fragility 
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The analysis of the stages in the diagram of the above-mentioned model concerning 
the dynamics of the financial state of the units as described by variables, ( *
it k , kit ), 
shows that this state fluctuates clockwise in an orbit around the centre,  ) , ( i 1 1 P  { Z ,
located in the intersection point of the variables with values kit = 1 and  *
it k  = 1-P
(Figure 2). Centre Z represents an equilibrium state in the sense of the dynamic term 
(Vercelli, 2009a, p. 13). 
There is an infinit number of possible orbits around centre Z , which depend on the 
initial conditions and various (external and internal) shocks. The shocks causing an 
increase in variables  *
it k  and kit change the representative points in external orbits that 
reach large areas beyond not only the safety limit, but also beyond the solvency 
barrier as well as beyond the liquidity line and this leads to the instability state of the 
system. Varicelli’s model can explain this trend. For this purpose, we must consider 
the relation between mass (group) psychology and the formation of expectations in a 
highly financialized world (Epstein, 2008; Palley, 2008). According to this relation, the 
state of a long-lasting boom causes an increasing euphoria of exaggerated 
confidence in expectations and the weakening of the capability to perceive a risk, 
which materializes in the expansion of the sub-primes and the broad expansion of the 
derivates, which stimulates an exuberant growth of the loans for investment and 
consumption along with the relaxation of the guarantees for loans. 
Figure 2 
 Financial fluctuations: Dynamic and structural instability 
All means that the safety limit of the system traced in the diagram, (1 - P ), changes to 
the right, (1 -  * P ). Therefore, this change causes the extension of the stage, when the 
representative point (equilibrium point, P) moves upwards and to the right close to the 
insolvency barrier, and many more fragile units are pushed over this barrier on the 
way to bankruptcy (Figure 2). Institute of Economic Forecasting
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When the number of such units is high and their size and impact on the economy are 
significant, the system undergoes changes, moving gradually to the instability state 
(departure from the dynamic equilibrium state) and, consequently, to chaos. 
To make the above-mentioned model operational, Sordi and Vercelli considered the 
requirement that the feedback between the current liquidity coefficient, kit, and the 
expected solvency coefficient,  *
it k , should be expressed in difference equations to 
characterize the unstable behaviour of the dynamic system. 
These equations take the following form: 




it 1 1  E      (5) 
> @ ) ( k k k *
it it it P   D     1 1  (6) 
The same dynamic system can also take an aggregate form per representative units 
in which the current liquidity rates and the financial intertemporal solvency rates 
should represent average amounts. 
By means of the graphic representation of the system of relations presented above 
(Figure 2) we can find that the system instability (where  1 ! *
it k ) is reached gradually, 
starting from the singular point,  ) , ( P i i 1 1 P  {  by the interaction of the current financial 
constraints and the intertemporal ones, unless certain barriers or ceilings are set.
For example, we may get an intertemporal financial coefficient lower or, at most, equal 
to i G  1 , set as a maximum limit (barrier) up to which a financial unit can be exposed, 
and this is generally accepted by creditors. The value  *
i i k   G  1  redefines the financial 
instability of the unit with parameter i G  in a certain area in relation to the financial 
position and the confidence in the unit or the financial system. 
Figure 3 
The diagram of the dynamic system stages  Models of Financial System Fragility 
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Dieci, Sordi and Vercelli extended the analysis of the financial system fragility to the 
entire economy using. To build the model, they assume that the system as a whole 
does not enter an area of intertemporal financial rates higher than unit
18. This 
assumption determined the authors to reformulate equation (5), i.e., the right side 
should be below or equal to 1 to be valid. The discrete dynamic formalisation of the 



















^ ` 1 1 1 ), K ( K min K t
* *
t  E    
When it comes to the entire economy we should consider that the total cash outflow, 
Et, is the sum regarding the endogenous private aggregate outflows,  pr
t E , and the 
public exogenous net aggregate outflows,  pu
t E  , that is,  pu
t
pr
t t E E E    . In turn, the 
public net cash outflows represent the summing-up of public deficit,  t D , and the 
exchange of the currency in circulation, ǻM, i.e.  M D E t
pu '    , and the public deficit 
represents the difference between public expenditure, Gt, and revenue from taxes and 
other collections from the private sector, Tt, i.e., Dt = Gt - Tt. If the public net cash 
outflows are positive,  0 ! '    t t
pu
t M D E , this means an inflow in the private sector of 
additional amounts of cash flows equal to those going out from the public sector
19.
As for accounting, there is equality between aggregate cash outflows from buyers, Et,
and the aggregate cash inflows, Yt, from sellers. Still, we should consider that there is 
a lag between cash inflows and outflows of the financial units: Et = Yt+1.




















E     1 1 , K
Y
E E







t  (7) 
> @ ) ( K K K *
t t t P   D     1 1  (8) 
t t E Y   1  (9) 
> @ ^ ` pu
t t
*
t t E Y ) ( K K E  P   D     1 1  (10) 
which remains valid if: 
> @ 0 1 1 t P   D     ) ( K K K *
t t t . (11) 
                                                          
18 It is important to note that this assumption is not valid at the unit level since units may become 
bankrupt and, consequently, reach or even go beyond the barrier  i G  1 .
19 The situation can be reversed, when the public net cash outflows are negative 
0  '    t M t D pu
t E . These two situations generate two categories of important political 
regimes concerning the dynamic behaviour of the macroeconomic system: inflation and 
deflation.Institute of Economic Forecasting
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The model includes the condition of non-negativity of the dynamic variables and, 
besides, K
* may be considered a measure of the fragility of the entire economy. 
By numerical simulations, the authors show that the dynamic model presented could 
produce endogenous fluctuations in the current and intertemporal financial rates of a 
remarkable sensitivity. The trajectory and the quality of these fluctuations depend on 
the key parameters, Į and ȕ, and various possible cases of values may receive 
specific interpretations as follows
20:
x  When key parameters, Į and ȕ, take very low values, the system reaches a long-
term stationary stable state. 
x When  parameter  ȕ is small and the response of parameter Į is high enough (but 
in a normal state, 0<Į<1), fluctuations occur along a continuously closed 
attracting curve that is touched by the system independently of the initial state. 
x  For very high values of parameters Į and ȕ there is a strange attractor when the 
system dynamics is chaotic. In this case, a ceiling of variable 
*
t K  changes the 
nature of financial fluctuations, from even to uneven. 
x When  parameter  Į is high and parameter ȕ is conservative there is a special 
regime in which a stable stationary state coexists with a closed attracting curve. 
The ceiling of variable 
*
t K  seems responsible for the sudden appearance of an 
attractor and for the complicated structure of the attractor pools. 
Such qualitative analyses based on numerical simulations are necessary to acquire 
profound knowledge of the evolution and behaviour directions of the variables and the 
parameters and orientate the anti-crisis decisions. 
5. Conclusions 
In this survey, we review the main results obtained in the field of modelling the fragility 
of the monetary and financial system from a conceptual and methodological 
perspective.
Since such a vast issue was dealt with in a limited space, many aspects and valuable 
models were left aside. The space did not allow us to make more comments on the 
works and ideas and of other important authors who made contributions to this field or 
even initiated profound research of high complexity and technicality such as: Fisher, 
(1933); Fölmer (1974); Goodwin (1988, 1990); Hicks (1950, 1974); Keen (2000); 
Kregel (2007); May (1976); Rosser (2005). In this respect, we give the following 
illustrative examples: the use of the multiplier and accelerator in defining and 
diminishing the fragility o the fiscal system, the widening of the domain of models 
                                                          
20 Parameter Į measures the speed at which the current financial rate, Kt, responds to the 
deviation of the intertemporal financial rate,  *
t K , from the safety limit, 1 – µ. High values of 
parameter Į means an overreaction of the financial units. Parameter ȕ measures the intensity 
at which the current financial rate affects the future (expected) financial constraints 
represented by the intertemporal financial rate.  Models of Financial System Fragility 
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regarding the explicit use of the theory of catastrophe and the chaos theory to 
interpret and describe financial instability, the connections between financial instability 
and the instability of the real economy, the construction and use of systems able to 
signal financial instability and the definition of the conditions for the transition from the 
chaos state to the normal state of the system during the cyclical financial fluctuations, 
the impact of the inflationary political regime and of the deflationary one on the 
qualitative characteristics of the dynamic behaviour of the macroeconomic system. 
But by our presentation we tried to cover the most significant part of the research 
outcome in the field, starting with comments on the early generations of models and 
going on with more recent models that seemed adequate to explain the instability of 
the present financial system. 
It is a known fact that Marx, Schumpeter, Keynes and Minsky are the economists who 
openly discussed the problem of the stability and instability of the economic and 
financial capitalist system. This caused a real gap among economists and publications 
as regards the approach to the matter: those who further trusted the traditional 
thought, called orthodox, and those who joined without reserve the new trend called 
the new economics. The fact that both groups – although they made important 
scientific contributions – ignore one another is quite harmful. Paying attention to the 
conceptual and methodological contribution of both groups, beyond any ideology, for 
explaining and interpreting financial instability means more opportunities to expand 
the knowledge horizon and more theoretical and practical approaches and solutions.
A heterodox approach is more and more requested (Colander, Holt, Rosser Jr., 2007; 
Voinea, 2009) since this means, on one side, considering the multitude of opinions, 
methodologies and solutions for covering the huge variety of aspects of the countries’ 
economic and social reality, and, on the other hand, meeting the expectations of the 
society with regard to economic research, which has to increase its contribution to 
signalling and monitoring financial and economic instability and providing solutions for 
overcoming the crisis. 
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